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DEMOCRATIZING THE ECONOMIC SPHERE: A
CASE FOR THE POLITICAL BOYCOTT
Theresa J. Lee*
ABSTRACT

The political boycott, though recently under attack through litigation
aimed at compelled disclosure regimes, is a critical tool in constructing
American democracy. Defining political boycotts as those refusals by
consumers to buy goods or patronize businesses in order to effect political or
social change, this Article is the first paper to place the political boycott at
home in all three classic theories underlying the First Amendment: the
marketplace of ideas, democracy and self-governance, and self-expression and
autonomy. It also situates the boycott alongside current campaign finance
doctrine via Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010). Just as money amassed by corporations in the economic marketplace
can be used to influence the political, the boycott allows those whose main
economic resource is their participation in the market as consumers to
aggregate that resource, with other like-minded consumers, to influence the
political marketplace.
The Article also explores the doctrinal implications of these arguments
for ongoing lawsuits challenging compelled disclosure regimes. As-applied
challenges to such laws can be granted upon a sufficient evidentiary showing of
"threats, harassment, or reprisals." This Article argues that the boycott cannot
be categorized in this way. Especially in the case of initiatives and referenda,
the political boycott is a critical tool of petition and should not be considered in
this as-applied harassment analysis.
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INTRODUCTION

Following the passage of Proposition 8 in California, the director of the
Proposition 8 campaign, bemoaning the compelled disclosure of campaign
donors, declared that protestors "don't have a right to blacklist and boycott our
supporters."' While such rhetoric is run of the mill, when such claims spill out
of the court of public opinion and into the courts of law, a key First
Amendment right is put at risk. Following a decades-long assault on campaign
finance more broadly, the past three years have seen a turn against disclosure,
the one tool that was once widely lauded on all sides of the debate.2 This
generation of disclosure challenges3 are characterized by efforts to paint a
narrative of "threats, harassment, or reprisals"A in order to obtain an as-applied
exemption from these laws of general applicability. Common to all of these
claims is the inclusion of the boycott in the litany of dangers some believe

I Martin Wisckol, Prop. 8 Leaders Accuse Foes of Harassment, Intimidation, ORANGE
CNTY. REG., Nov. 14, 2008, http://www2.ocregister.com/articles/prop-vassos-leaders-2229235gay-marriage.
2
See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance
DisclosureLaws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. &POL. 557, 558-59 (2012).
3
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Nat'l Org. for
Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011); Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d
914 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Doe v. Reed, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
4
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976).
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political supporters face.s While boycotts may draw the ire of those targeted, it
is exactly because boycotts may have tangible impacts that they are not ignored
and instead portrayed as something other than what they are: protected First
Amendment activity. The protected status of the political boycott stands in
stark contrast to the declarations of those targeted that boycotters do not have a
right to undertake such activity.
Boycotts have long been a subject of contention, but in the case of
political boycotts, they have also played a critical role in American
democracy. 6 This Article considers the status of the political consumer boycott,
defined as a refusal to buy goods or patronize certain businesses undertaken by
individuals in their role as consumers and citizens in order to effect political or
social change, challenging the recent efforts to recharacterize the political
boycott. It is the first Article to situate the political boycott within all three of
the classic theories underlying the First Amendment, showing not only the
historical and precedential underpinnings of the boycott, but also arguing that
this type of political activity lives up to the values that motivate constitutional
protection.
Not only is the boycott a mode of political action of long pedigree,7 but
also it is a particularly well-suited tool of political action and agency creation in
a political landscape dominated by interests related not to voting power but to
monetary power.8 In a time with the highest levels of campaign contribution
and spending in history,9 the boycott is not some antiquated last ditch resort,
but rather the manifestation of money as speech for those without extreme

5
See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 981 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("opponents threatened to boycott and picket the next festival."); Protectmarriage.com v.
Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Declaration of John Doe #1) ("His
business has since been targeted by numerous boycotts, several orchestrated through Facebook.
At one point, someone paid for a sponsored link on Google so that a search for John Doe #1's
store resulted in a website referencing his support for Proposition 8 and urging a boycott."); Brief
for Petitioner at 11, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-559), 2010 WL 711186, at *ll
("Boycotts were threatened: 'We shall boycott the businesses of EVERYONE who signs your
odious, bigoted petition."' (citation omitted)).
6
See generally LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, BUYING POWER: A HISTORY OF CONSUMER
ACTIVISM IN AMERICA (2009) (presenting history of consumer boycotts in America as political

activity).
7
See generally GARY M[NDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: How IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY
SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND (1999).
8
See, e.g., CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CORPORATE CAMPAIGN
available at
(2010),
5-10
A
VOICE
SHAREHOLDERS
GIvING
SPENDING:

http://brennan.3cdn.net/54a676e48lfl9bfb8_bvm6ivakn.pdf (considering the impact of Citizens
United).
9
Eduardo Porter, How the Big Money Finds a Way In, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2011, at SRI2,
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2011/09/18/opinion/sunday/1 8editorial
available at
deconstructionl.html?ref-sunday ("Soaring Federal Election Spending" Graph).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4
534

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115

wealth-power accumulated in the economic marketplace-coming to bear on
the political sphere.
Boycotts are indeed powerful. They do, in fact, have the ability to exact
real-world, human costs from those businesses and individuals targeted. The
concern over boycotts exists because they have consequences that might have
the potential to extend outward from their target to impact a boycotted
business's employees or community. Recognizing this impact, however, does
not conclude the analysis. The profound First Amendment benefits of the
boycott are many: it implicates core political speech; it can place consumers,
usually the lowliest player in the economic sphere, on more equal footing with
producers in impacting the political sphere; and disclosure regimes bestow
invaluable information on the entire electorate and the State. These benefits
outweigh the possible day-to-day impacts of the boycott.
Boycotts are often invoked as unfortunate collateral consequences that
with
efforts towards accountability and transparency. This is a mistake.
come
The boycott is formative to the project of American democracy and vindicates
key First Amendment values. It should be celebrated, not mourned. In addition
to this theoretical claim, this Article also presents a related doctrinal charge: the
boycott cannot legitimately be used to undermine compelled disclosure
regimes. Compelled disclosure regimes have consistently been upheld by the
courts, but just as consistently, the courts have recognized that in a particular
instance, a group could prevail in an as-applied challenge to compelled
disclosure upon a sufficient showing of "threats, harassment, or reprisals." 0
Political boycotts are characterized in compelled disclosure litigation as an
unfortunate, negative consequence or, at best, merely ancillary to the
informational and accountability benefits of the disclosure regime." For
example, in a challenge to California's Political Reform Act,12 the district
court, while nonetheless finding in favor of disclosure, underscores the
importance of the state's informational interest in disclosure as wholly distinct
from any individual's additional use of public information to facilitate a
boycott. 3
This long-used form of political engagement blends economic and
expressive elements. Some may have the instinct to recoil from the boycott for
this very reason, trying to wall off the political from the economic. To dismiss
the boycott on these grounds is misguided, as the political and the economic are
already constantly thrust against one another, and the political boycott serves as
a critical counterweight to the intersection between these two spheres
elsewhere. In today's current climate, where the political and economic spheres
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 100 (1982); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976).
"
See, e.g., Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1219 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
12
Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d 914, 914 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
13
Protectmarriage.com,599 F. Supp. 2d at 1219.
to
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are so tightly intertwined' 4 and democratic activity has long since bubbled
outside of organized campaigns and the voting booth,' 5 the boycott should be
viewed with the highest respect. Thus, this Article recognizes the political
boycott not only as a long-established and distinguished form of political
expression in the United States, but also as particularly fitting in the current
climate. Three distinct strands characterize the current American political
moment: (1) many people do not believe that they are represented by their
elected leaders; 16 (2) there is an unprecedented amount of money pouring into
elections and lobbying of elected officials;' 7 and (3) much democratic activity
takes place outside of the ballot box as the economic crisis causes people to
reassess their political abilities. 8 This third factor can perhaps be seen as a
positive response to these first two concerns.
Rather than serving as an example of threats or harassment, the
political boycott is wholly consistent when viewed through the lenses of
history, precedent, and the theories of the First Amendment. And while the
concern over the boycott is neither a singular nor a new phenomenon,' 9 the
current complaints regarding political boycotts are more than mere appeals for
public support by those being boycotted. Such complaints are being deployed

14
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (overruling
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990), which prevented corporate
spending because the status of corporations allowed "them to use 'resources amassed in the
economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair advantage in the political marketplace"' (citation
omitted)); SUSAN M. LIss & MICHAEL WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RENEWING
DEMOCRACY AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 2 (2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page//publications/RenewingDemocracy.pdfnocdn=1 (identifying politics as "money-drenched";
highlighting big money lobbying efforts).
15
See Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, The Fightfor "Real Democracy" at the Heart of
Occupy Wall Street, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 11. 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
print/98542?page=show (presenting the Occupy Wall Street protests as a reaction to lack of real
political representation); Jeremy Kessler, Occupy Wall Street and the Rediscovery of Politics,
THE UTOPIAN (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.the-utopian.org/post/13785153936/ occupy-wall-streetand-the-rediscovery-of-politics (looking at Occupy Wall Street as political activity "beyond the
prescribed avenues of official political reform").
16
Hardt & Negri, supra note 15.

17
See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, In Cash Push, 2 CampaignsLikely to Reject Public Funds,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2012, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/us/
the
(quoting
politics/campaigns-plan-maximum-push-to-raise-money.html?pagewanted=all
president of Common Cause as saying, "[t]his is going to be the most moneyed election in the
history of the United States"); Brad Knickerbocker, Behind the Meteoric Rise in Campaign

Spending,

CHRISTIAN

SCI.

MONITOR

BLOG

(Nov.

14,

2010),

http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/The-Vote/2010/1114/Behind-the-meteoric-rise-incampaign-spending.
18
Hardt & Negri, supra note 15.
19

GLICKMAN, supra note 6, at 133-51.
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in litigation 2 0 in order to challenge the campaign finance and other public
disclosure regimes at the heart of democratic accountability and transparency. 21
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld compelled disclosure regimes,
while leaving the door open for as-applied exemptions.2 2 The protected status
of the boycott under the First Amendment cautions very strongly against using
it as evidence of the "threats, harassment, or reprisals" 23 that necessitate an asapplied exemption. This Article argues that the boycott should not be
considered in harassment analyses in cases of compelled disclosure.24
The Article establishes the historical and legal development of the
political boycott in the United States. Part II outlines the historical trajectory of
boycotts from the colonial era through the modem day and moves on to trace
the path of the political boycott in the federal courts. Strong precedent
recognizes the value of the boycott and cautions against conceiving of the
boycott in these same courts as something other than protected activity. This
Part emphasizes the roots of the boycott in democracy formation in the United
States with the aim of considering the modem boycott with a clear
understanding of the importance of this form of political activity.
In Part III, this Article proceeds to situate the boycott in the three
classic theories of the First Amendment: (1) the marketplace of ideas, (2)
democracy and self-govemance, and (3) self-expression and autonomy. The
political boycott serves the value of the marketplace of ideas in two ways. First,
the boycott serves to push ideas into the marketplace to be tested for their

20
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 981 (2010) (Thomas,
J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that "opponents threatened to boycott and picket
the next festival"); Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(quoting Declaration of John Doe #1) ("His business has since been targeted by numerous
boycotts, several orchestrated through Facebook. At one point, someone paid for a sponsored link
on Google so that a search for John Doe #1's store resulted in a website referencing his support
for Proposition 8 and urging a boycott."); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 11 ("Boycotts
were threatened: 'We shall boycott the businesses of EVERYONE who signs your odious,
bigoted petition."' (citation omitted)).
21
See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 at 886-88; Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649
F.3d 34, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2011); Protectmarriage.com,830 F. Supp. 2d at 916-22 (E.D. Cal.
2011); Doe v. Reed, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1196-98 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
22
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913-16; McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93,
194-202 (2003), overruledby Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6974 (1976).
23
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 100 (1982).
24
For a similar argument, see Elian Dashev, Note, Economic Boycotts as Harassment: The
Threat to FirstAmendment ProtectedSpeech in the Aftermath of Doe v. Reed, 45 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 207 (2011). Dashev's Note argues against considering the political boycott as harassment in
compelled disclosure cases involving "Major Political Players," and considers the status of the
boycott especially through the lens of the opinions in Doe, 130 S. Ct. 2811. Id. at 213, 223-36.
Though referring to them as economic boycotts, Dashev's focus is on the boycott deployed for
political purposes and not on economic boycotts as discussed in infra Part V.A.
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value. Boycotts are classic examples of the marketplace of ideas as they, more
than other forms of political conduct, necessarily depend on convincing others
for their very continuation. Second, political boycotts are an instantiation of the
marketplace of ideas. Ideas and the actual market interact with one another to
press for political change.
The mingling of the economic and the political may give pause to
some, but the boycott is a needed counterweight to the other varied examples of
the political and economic spheres mixing in American society. There is a
highly-regulated area of law where these two spheres already mix: campaign
finance. This Article applies recent campaign finance theory and doctrine to the
political boycott to show the impossibility of setting the boycott outside of the
protections of the First Amendment in the face of this analogous doctrine.
Part III next progresses to characterize the boycott as an exercise in
democracy and self-governance, under the theories of both Alexander
Meiklejohn 25 and Robert Post.2 6 When considered through the lens of the final
theory of the First Amendment (self-expression and autonomy), there is value
even in an unsuccessful boycott. The political boycott exists, as does every
boycott, only through "a host of voluntary decisions by free citizens." 27 While
no other minds may be changed in the end, an unsuccessful boycott still
provides internal effectiveness to those participating.
Part IV moves from the theoretical to the doctrinal, considering the asapplied standard for challenges to compelled disclosure laws, and arguing that
boycotts can never rightly be considered examples of "threats, harassment, or
reprisals,"2 8 as the doctrine requires. This Part argues that the informational
interest at stake in non-candidate elections is higher than it is in candidate
elections. Where citizens are akin to both legislators and lobbyists, disclosure is
vital because the usual information-providing cues, such as party affiliation, are
not available to voters. Because ordinary people are serving the legislative
function, great deference should be given to the boycott. Without constituent
services or offices in the state house, boycotts are the only means of petitioning
one's fellow citizen-legislators.
Part V considers a series of counterarguments that attempt to tie the
political boycott to other market activity in an effort to upend support for such
boycotts. This Part also elucidates the difference between individual economic
retaliation and the boycott. On average, the power differentials in the situation
of individual economic retaliation are so great that it should be set apart from
the political boycott. Additionally, the boycott is dialogic, while a political
firing has no such element. Boycotts also call for a long series of collective
25

ALEXANDERIMEKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION To SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).

26

Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88

CALIF. L. REv. 2353, 2367 (2000).
27
28

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 888-89 (1982).
Brown, 459 U.S. at 100; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976).
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decisions, while economic retaliation is unilateral and occurs only at one point
in time, without any ability to fluctuate in strength or effect.
Finally, Part V turns to concerns over boycotts that are deployed
because of who someone is rather than for a clear decisional goal. While
Professor Michael Harper draws a distinction between the First Amendment
protections to be afforded to each of these types of boycotts in his seminal
paper on boycotts, 2 9 his argument is incomplete. The Court has often cautioned
against line drawing between closely related identity and conduct. 30 Trying to
pull these two apart is likely a futile effort. Thus, the response to a boycott that
one considers abhorrent should be a marshaling of support for the intended
target, and one should use expression in order to shame that boycott into
collapsing. The response to a boycott should not be the withdrawal of
constitutional status. The First Amendment is a rough-and-tumble place, and a
consistent theory of the First Amendment, broadly, and of boycotts,
specifically, cannot grant protection to only those actions one sees as laudable.
II. THE POLITICAL BOYCOTT
A.

A BrieffHistory of the PoliticalBoycott in the United States

The use of the boycott to achieve political ends is older than the United
States and was a critical form of political action that gave rise to our colonial
revolutionary moment. The deep roots of the political boycott caution against
its dismissal as mere coercion or inappropriate action. In NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., ("ClaiborneHardware") the case in which the Supreme Court
recognized the protected status of the political boycott,3 the NAACP
understood the roots of the American political boycott and called on this long
history to underscore the validity of the civil rights boycotters. In oral
arguments, Lloyd Cutler grounded his legal argument in the fact "that this
nation was born out of a series of colonial boycotts against British merchants in
support of petitions to the British king and Parliament for the redress of
grievances."32 The use of the boycott did not cease with the end of the colonial
period and the birth of the nation. In fact, at the time of ratification of the
Constitution, founders Alexander Hamilton and John Jay were leading a
boycott against New York merchants who engaged in the slave trade.33 Thus,
the boycott is not a tool whose legitimacy must stand apart from the underlying
29
Michael C. Harper, The Consumer's Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware andIts Implicationsfor American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409, 429-30 (1984).
30
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
31
32

ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 911-12.
Transcript of Petitioner's Oral Argument at 5, Claiborne Hardware,458 U.S. 886 (No. 81-

202).
SId.

at 8.
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structure of our governance and legal system; it is a part and parcel of our
system. The boycott is a means of communication valued under the First
Amendment, which has been used on all sides of controversies throughout
American history.
As early as 1900 and throughout more than the first half of the
twentieth century, boycotts were deployed to fight racial injustice. Between
1900 and 1906, streetcar boycotts took place in over twenty-five Southern cities
to fight against the segregation laws of Jim Crow. "Although technically the
new segregation laws represented an abridgment of the consumer right to
choose ... symbolically they represented much more-unjust acts whose effect
was 'to humiliate, to degrade, and to stigmatize .

. .

.

These boycotts were

largely fueled by cooperation, but in some instances social pressures were used
as well; for example, "[i]n Savannah, [Georgia,] those who opposed the
boycotts were publicly denounced at mass meetings as 'demagogues and
hypocrites.'" 3 5 The bus boycotts of the 1950s were similar to the streetcar
boycotts of the early part of the century; in both instances, the social ill being
protested existed within target of the protest-segregated streetcars and buses.
The Montgomery bus boycott-perhaps the "best-known and most
influential consumer boycott in America's history" 3 6-persisted for more than a
year. While the boycott alone did not achieve the social change for which the
boycotters aimed, the boycott "along with favorable court decisions, helped to
advance the collective interest of the African-American community in
Montgomery, Alabama."37 In Gayle v. Browder, the Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court decision that struck down the state and local laws segregating
the busing system. While it is true that "authorities remained impervious to
the adverse publicity the boycott brought them, to the economic losses it caused
local business, and to the moral pressures of nonviolent resistance,"39 the
federal courts do not operate in a vacuum, and the nationwide focus on this
boycott was certainly not missed by the judges of the district court or the
Supreme Court justices. 40 The boycott itself provided social cohesion,

34
MONROE FRIEDMAN, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS: EFFECTING
MARKETPLACE AND THE MEDIA 92 (1999) (citation omitted).
36

Id. at 93 (citation omitted).
Id. at 96-97.

3

MINDA, supra note 7, at 134.

3

Gayle v. Bowder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam).

3

CHANGE

THROUGH

THE

3
CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF SOUTHERN
TRANSIT 124 (1983).
40
FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 104-05.
41
Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery
Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 1066 (1989) ("The boycott made black Montgomerians aware of
themselves as a community with obligations and capacities to which they and others had
previously been blind. On the eve of the boycott, few would have imagined the latent abilities
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especially between classes of African Americans,4 2 and "imbued Dr. King and
his organization with a sense of solidarity to implement social change."A3
The civil rights movement used boycotts throughout the South, and
unlike those of the Montgomery bus system, the desired social change was not
only one that could be granted by the express targets of the boycott. In 1971,
the black community staged a boycott of all the white retail merchants in
Marianna, Arkansas. The aim of the boycott was to "secure the attention of the
'white establishment,'" seen as responsible for many acts of discrimination
toward the black residents of Marianna.4 After nearly eight months of
boycotting, the boycotters submitted a list of demands, and both sides requested
assistance from a gubernatorial task force. 4 5 After the boycott had been in effect
for over a year, black leaders cited several areas where progress had been
made, and the boycott came to an end.46 The use of economic pressure led to
political change.
A similar boycott to that of Marianna gave birth to the Supreme Court
jurisprudence recognizing the political boycott as a First Amendment protected
form of political speech. Beginning in March of 1966, the black community in
Claiborne County, Mississippi, presented white elected officials with a list of
demands focused on racial equality and integration. 47 The complaints were
brushed aside, and at a local NAACP meeting, a large portion of the black
community voted to begin a boycott. 48 The boycott lasted seven years, calling
for "the desegregation of all public schools and public facilities, the hiring of
black policemen, public improvements in black residential areas, selection of
blacks for jury duty, integration of bus stations so that blacks could use all
facilities, and an end to verbal abuse by law enforcement officers."49 The
petition also asserted that "[n]egroes are not to be addressed by terms as 'boy,'
'girl,' 'shine,' 'uncle,' or any other offensive term, but as 'Mr.,' 'Mrs.,' or

that resided within that community. The protest elicited and clarified those abilities. On the eve
of the boycott, few black Montgomerians would have considered themselves as persons with
important political duties. The protest inculcated and enlarged their sense of responsibility.
Moreover, by publicizing their willingness and ability to mobilize united opposition to Jim Crow
practices, the protesters in Montgomery contributed a therapeutic dose of inspiration to dissidents
everywhere. Later developments would attest to the influence of the boycott as a role model that
encouraged other acts of rebellion. Participants in subsequent protests remember Montgomery as
a distinct, encouraging presence.").
42
Id. at 1023.
43

MINDA, supra note 7.

4

FRIEDMAN,

45
46

Id. at 120.
Id

47

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 889 (1982).

48

Id.
Id. at 899.

49

supra note 34, at 119 (citation omitted).
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'Miss,' as is the case with other citizens."o The purpose of the boycott "was to
The legal
gain equal rights and opportunities for Negro citizens."'
ramifications of the boycott would not be known until sixteen years after it
began. The next section of this Part turns to the substance of the Claiborne
Hardwaredecision.

African-Americans are not the only minority group that has deployed
the political boycott in the face of overwhelming social and political forces that
could not otherwise be addressed. Both women and gay rights groups have
followed in the footsteps of the original civil rights movement using the boycott
as a tool to create "solidarity and collective impetus" 52 in order to effect social
change. The National Organization of Women ("NOW") deployed boycotts as
a means of petitioning state governments in order to try to secure passage of the
Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"). NOW called for a boycott of the states
that had not yet passed the ERA. In Missouri, this boycott was challenged by
the State as a violation of state tort law and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.5 4 The
next section of this Part turns to the substance of the federal court decision
related to the NOW boycott.
Gay rights groups have also made use of the boycott. In the early
1990s, the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power ("ACT UP") boycotted Philip
Morris in an effort to influence its support of Senator Jesse Helms, who
frequently publicly condemned homosexuality.ss The boycott failed to
dramatically influence support for Helms, but succeeded in bringing gay issues
to the consciousness of Philip Morris, which then pledged contributions of
more than $2 million annually to gay rights and AIDS organizations.56 A gay
rights boycott of Cracker Barrel began in 1991 after the company fired a
number of gay and lesbian employees and issued a statement saying that
Cracker Barrel "would not hire [anyone] whose sexual preferences fail to
demonstrate normal, heterosexual values."57 The boycott included organized
demonstrations outside of the restaurants, often timed to coincide with the
brunch crowds on Sundays, and "slow-down sit-ins," whereby protestors would
go into the restaurant and occupy tables for hours while ordering a mere cup of
coffee.5 8 This boycott lasted for over a decade, with Cracker Barrel refusing to
consider enacting a non-discrimination policy that offered protection based on

5
51

Id
Id.

52

MINDA, supra note 7.

5

FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 151.

54

Missouri v. Nat'1 Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 147.

5

56
5
58

Id at 147-48.
Id at 150.
Id.
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sexual orientation and with boycotters, likewise, continuing in their resolve.
Over eleven years later, the boycott ended when, in November 2002, the board
of Cracker Barrel voted unanimously to enact the non-discrimination policy
that had been approved by a 58% shareholder proxy vote. 59 A very similar
boycott to that directed at Cracker Barrel was deployed in just the past year.
Following statements by the president of Chick-Fil-A against the expansion of
marriage rights to same-sex couples, there were various calls for boycotts of the
restaurant chain throughout the country. 6 0 The continuing use of the boycott to
effect social and political change illustrates that this mode of engagement is not
merely a historical artifact, but that the boycott continues to serve as an
important mode of participation in this democracy.
A final example of the use of the boycott by gay rights groups parallels
the Montgomery Bus Boycott, where the courts ended up undoing "the
offensive government action that a boycott had attempted to defy." 6 1 In 1992,
voters in Colorado approved an amendment to the state constitution that would
repeal laws preventing discrimination based on sexual orientation and prohibit
their passage in the future. 6 2 The call for the boycott was made the very next
day.63 The two courses of action for the boycott were to discourage travel to
Colorado and to encourage customers not to purchase goods from Colorado

59
Jeremy Quittner, Cracker Barrel Buckles: The Family Restaurant's Change of Heart
Provides a Prime Example for Activists Committed to Reforming Other Antigay Corporations,
THE ADVOC., Feb. 4, 2003, at 24, 25 ("The change stems in large part from the work of the New
York City Employees' Retirement System, one of five pension funds for New York City
workers, which together control 391,000 shares of stock in CBRL.... For 10 years NYCERS
has sponsored shareholder proposals that would push Cracker Barrel to overhaul its employment
policy through a proxy vote. . . . Prior to the November 26 meeting, shareholders controlling 58%
of CBRL's 49.8 million outstanding shares voted by proxy to approve the proposal. Although no
vote was formally taken at the meeting, immediately afterward the board voted unanimously to
adopt the nondiscrimination policy.").
60
Jena McGregor, Chick-fil-A PresidentDan Cathy Bites into Gay-MarriageDebate, WASH.
1:01
PM),
19,
2012,
PosT
BLOG
(July
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-leadership/post/chick-fil-a-president-dan-cathy-bitesinto-gay-marriage-debate/2012/07/19/gJQACrvzvWblog.html.; see also How Can Something So
Good Be So Evil?, BoYcoTT CHICKFILA, http://boycottchickfila.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2012).
61

FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 149.

62

COLO. CONST. amend. II (repealed 1994). The text of Amendment 2 read:
Neither the state of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts,
shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any
person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the
Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.

63

FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 148.
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businesses. 4 This boycott was both swift and widespread, with over 100
official participant groups. The impact was being felt in Colorado, but the
boycott was suspended in 1994 when the state Supreme Court found the
amendment to be unconstitutional.65 The United States Supreme Court later
went on to affirm the decision of the state court. 66
The Civil Rights Movement was by no means the only group early in
the century to use the boycott to achieve political or social ends. In the 1930s,
the Catholic Church, in response to what was viewed as "vulgarity and
coarseness" in the movies, 6 7 instituted a boycott against motion "pictures which
violated the Motion Picture Production Code."6 8 Using the clout and social
network of the Church, a pledge was read and distributed to between seven and
nine million Catholics, accounting for over a third of all the Catholics in
America. 6 9 Takers of the pledge joined the "National Legion of Decency,"
vowed not to watch the identified movies, and promised to recruit more people
to the legion, 7 0 that is, to continue and grow the boycott. The boycott was not
limited to one religious denomination. Rather within just a few months, over
seven million individuals of all different religious backgrounds were
participating in the boycott. 7 1 This external pressure proved to be more
successful than even government regulation 72 with the motion picture
association continuing, even today, to be regulated by an independent oversight
body that assesses the content of movies in terms of violence, sex, and
profanity.
The use of the boycott to influence societal values was not a singular
incident isolated to the pre-war period. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
America Family Association ("AFA") and Christian Leaders for Responsible
Television undertook a series of boycotts of advertisers in order to influence the
content of television programming. 74 The former editor of the National Boycott
News, Todd Putnam, flagged this group's work as being responsible for an
"impressive list of boycott victories" in persuading advertisers to shift the

64

Id

65

Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 620 (1996).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 160.
RUTH A. INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES 121 (1947).
FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 161.

66

67
68
69
7o

Id. at 160-61.

n
Gregory D. Black, Hollywood Censored: The Production Code Administration and the
Hollywood Film Industry, 1930-1940, in 3 FILM HISTORY 167, 177 (1989).
72

INGLIS, supra note 68, at 125.

7
What
Each
Rating
Means,
MOTION
PICTURE
ASS'N
http://www.mpaa.org/ratings/what-each-rating-means (last visited Oct. 16, 2012).
7
FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 170.
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content of the shows they support to include less sex, violence, and profanity or
to change their advertising strategies to instead support programming with
values that conformed with those of the AFA.75 They later led a boycott of the
television show, Ellen, which featured a lesbian main character, which some
have pointed to as leading to the program's cancellation.76 AFA's boycotts
were not limited to media content. Making up the flip-side of the Cracker
Barrel and Phillip Morris boycotts discussed above, in 1996, the AFA, joined
by the Southern Baptist Conference, launched a boycott targeting the Walt
Disney Company to protest their "gay friendly" policies. 77
B.

The PoliticalBoycott in the Courts

In keeping with the storied history of the political boycott, the federal
courts have recognized and protected political consumer boycotts since the
ascension of these cases in the 1950s. Non-labor political boycotts were not
generally targeted by litigation in the early part of the twentieth century.
However, at mid-century, political boycotts were targeted both for damages and
injunctions, resulting in the political boycott being upheld in the circuit courts
far before the issue was finally addressed at the Supreme Court.
The Fifth Circuit, which from 1891 through 1981 covered most of the
former Confederacy, saw the bulk of the political boycott cases.78 In late 1967,
the Greenwood Movement was organized in Leflore County, Mississippi, to
combat racial discrimination. Following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr., the Movement began a boycott in order to "eliminate segregation and
discrimination; to make all men free; to create fair employment practices." 79
Because of scattered acts of violence concurrent with the boycott, the state
court enjoined all picketing, persuading of others to picket, congregating in the
public to do anything that would "directly or indirectly" persuade others not to
do business with the merchants, and announcing the names of anyone who
entered the business establishments.80 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of a
federal injunction against the Mississippi state injunction to "vindicate clear
First Amendment rights" inherent in the Greenwood boycott.8 ' The Court
determined that the rights involved in the Greenwood boycott were "[t]he most

75

Id

Bill Carter, TV Notes; Fate of "Ellen," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998,
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/25/arts/tv-notes-fate-of-ellen.html.
7
FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 170-71.
78
At mid-century, the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over Florida, Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. In 1981, the Circuit was split into the Fifth and the Eleventh
Circuits, with Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas remaining in the Fifth.
7
Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 1969).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 2 87.
76
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important public rights;" they were "political rights which determine the
composition of government and the direction of government policy." 82
Ten years later, the federal courts again considered a state injunction of
a political boycott. In Henry v. First National Bank,83 the Fifth Circuit first
addressed the boycott that would go on to become the substance of the
Supreme Court decision recognizing the right to the political boycott. The
Mississippi state court had issued an injunction and awarded damages from the
boycotters stemming from the seven-year boycott in Claiborne County,
Mississippi. In Henry, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court injunction
against enforcement of the state court injunction and damages award. Stressing
the likelihood of the boycotters prevailing on the merits of their First
Amendment claim, the court noted that the boycott at issue did not arise from
"parochial economic interest" but rather that all of the activity stemmed from
the effort for "elimination of racial discrimination in the town." 84 For the court,
the political nature of the boycott "differentiate[d] this case from a boycott
organized for economic ends, for speech to protest racial discrimination is
essential political speech lying at the core of the First Amendment."85
As the use of the boycott spilled out of the context of racial
discrimination, so too did federal court recognition of the political boycott as
core First Amendment speech. In 1977, after a number of defeats in state
legislatures, NOW launched a boycott of the states that had not yet ratified the
ERA, calling on supporters to refuse to travel to these states and to conduct no
business with companies located within them.86 Missouri, eschewing the state
courts entirely, brought an action for injunctive relief against NOW in federal
court, asserting violations under state antitrust law and the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.8 7 The district court denied relief, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, stressing
that the right of groups to undertake activity aimed at influencing the
government was within the core of the First Amendment guarantee of the right
to petition for redress of grievances.88 The court held "that NOW's boycott
activities are privileged on the basis of the First Amendment right to petition
and the Supreme Court's recognition of that important right when it collides
with commercial effects of trade restraints."89
Weighing in on a case sixteen years after the boycott at issue had
begun, and ten years after the boycott's conclusion, the Supreme Court decided

82
83
84

Id. at 288-89.
595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 303.

85

Id.

86

FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 152-53.

87

Missouri v. Nat'1 Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1302 (8th Cir. 1980).
Id.
Id at 1319.

88
89
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NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,90 as the question of the First Amendment

status of the political boycott finally made it to the Court in 1982. Though held
to be constitutionally protected in an opinion penned by Justice Stevens, the
lack of a direct statement declaring the boycott's own protected status has
perhaps left the door slightly open for today's critiques of the boycott, if only
as a rhetorical matter. 91
The Claiborne Hardware boycott began in 1966 after city leaders in
Port Huron, Mississippi, rebuffed demands for racial justice. The state court
imposed damages liability on the basis of common-law tort and issued a
permanent injunction of all boycott activity. 92 The state court determined, "[i]f
any of these factors-force, violence, or threats-is present, then the boycott is
illegal regardless of whether it is primary, secondary, economical, political,
social or other." 93 The Court determined that "[e]ach of these elements [refusal to patronize, speeches, and nonviolent picketing-] of the boycott is a
form of speech or conduct that is ordinarily entitled to protection under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments."94
In response to that arguments that the boycott should have lost its
protected character because of social pressure and coercion, the Court was
explicit, "[s]peech does not lose its protected character, however, simply
because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action."95 In fact, these
embarrassing or coercive effects of the speech are innate in its message. The
Court considered the concept of coercive impact to be intrinsic to any speech
aimed at persuasion: "[t]he claim that the expressions were intended to exercise
a coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of the
First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to influence respondent's
conduct by their activities; this is not fundamentally different from the function
of a newspaper." 96
The political boycott is the stuff of democratic construction, recognized
by the Court as "rest[ing] on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
While the holding of Claiborne Hardware recognizes the First Amendment-protected
status of the boycott, in the opinion, the Court addressed all of the elements of the boycott, but
failed to make a strong statement about the boycott itself. Id. at 907 ("Each of these elements of
the boycott is a form of speech or conduct that is ordinarily entitled to protection under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.").
92
Id. at 893.
90

91

93
94
9s
96

Id. at 895.
Id. at 907.
Id at 910.
Id at 911 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308

U.S. 147 (1939)).
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Amendment values." 9 7 The Court recognized that the boycott at issue was one
aimed at changing the political and social order, thus different from an
economic boycott. 9 8 "Through speech, assembly, and petition-rather than
through riot or revolution-petitioners sought to change a social order that had
consistently treated them as second-class citizens."99
The real complaint over the boycott in the current day does not rest on
a question over its status as expressive activity under the First Amendment, but
rather the complaint is one borne out of the speech's impacts, which is not an
appropriate ground for distinction under the Constitution.0oo The heart of
Claiborne Hardware shows that the boycott does not require the present day
arc of campaign finance jurisprudence to uphold its democratic legitimacy
under the First Amendment, but, as this Article argues, current campaign
finance jurisprudence underscores the discontinuity of arguing for unlimited
campaign and independent spending and against the boycott."0 '
III. THE POLITICAL BOYCOTT AND THEORIES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

It is well established that the First Amendment covers expressive
conduct.1 02 Both federal court precedent and the very values that underpin First
Amendment jurisprudence underscore the importance of awarding political
boycotts this protected status. The three main theories underlying the First
Amendment are (1) the marketplace of ideas, (2) democracy and selfgovernance, and (3) self-expression and autonomy. Each of these rubrics
confirms that the political boycott lies at the heart of the First Amendment.

97
Id. at 913 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467
(1980)).
98
While the Court recognized the right of the state to regulate economic activity, a right that
is likely to suffice when a state seeks to limit economic boycotts or expressly anti-competitive
conduct, they "[did] not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful political activity such as that
found in the boycott in this case." Id.
99

Id. at 912.

100 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) ("Urgent,

important, and effective speech can be no less protected than impotent speech."); N. Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (stating that criticism "does not lose its constitutional
protection merely because it is effective").
1or The groups that argue for unlimited campaign spending often overlap with those that hold
up the boycott as a form of threats, harassment, or reprisals. See, e.g., Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 546 U.S. 410 (2006); Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d
1197, 1198 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (both lead by James Bopp, Jr.).
102
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974).
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Marketplace of Ideas

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes first formulated the "marketplace of
ideas" in his dissent in Abrams v. United States, 03 often considered the
birthplace of modem First Amendment doctrine.104 Justice Holmes asserted that
truth can only be tested by "free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." 05
This estimation of the importance of the market to test ideas constantly recurs
in First Amendment case law. The Court has oft said that "' [i]t is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail."'l 06 The conception of the marketplace of ideas is
one where different sets of ideas are all released to the public sphere to vie for
supremacy. The truth-testing crucible of the marketplace of ideas allows the
truth, the best ideas, to rise to the top.
Boycotts fit into the marketplace of ideas theory perhaps even better
than other, more traditional, forms of expressive political conduct because
boycotts' success and continuation depend wholly on convincing others. An
individual can keep on leafleting in order to spread his or her idea, even if
convincing no one else. The idea still pervades the marketplace in its printed
word. Because the message of the boycott is conveyed not expressly in words,
if the boycott fails, the message ceases to be conveyed and can instead give
support to the opposite message. Regardless of the internal motivations of any
given boycotter, a boycott fails to make the same expressive impact without
common support; it devolves into individual market choice that is likely not
perceived to be sending a message. 0 7
Boycotts by their very nature are public. As a practical matter, boycotts
cannot remain private; without additional members, there is little non-personal
utility in even launching one. Thus, a boycott asserts itself into the public
sphere to be tested in the marketplace of ideas. In an "uninhibited
marketplace," the truth of a boycott can be tested. If the originators of a boycott
cannot persuade others to the rightness of their position, then the boycott will
fail, and little will be said in support of their cause by the failed attempt. In fact,

103

250 U.S. 616 (1919).

See Post, supra note 26, at 2356-60.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
106
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 507 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1993) (quoting Red Lion Broad Co., 395 U.S. at 390); Hustler
Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52, 56 (1988).
107
While a single individual could indeed continue a boycott on their own, no one would
know that is what they are doing unless they expressly made mention of it. While the decision
not to buy can certainly still be made by one individual, without public buy-in such a boycott
loses much of its message-conveying function. A boycott with common support, however,
conveys the message to the one being boycotted as they see it in their actual experience, either
through physical pickets or otherwise inexplicably declining receipts.
104
1o5

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss2/4

18

Lee: Democratizing the Economic Sphere: A Case for the Political Boyco
2012]

DEMOCRATIZING THE ECONOMIC SPHERE

549

a failed boycott may even credit the side being targeted because the targets can
easily illustrate the fact that the idea waged against them has not "ultimately
prevailed." A failed boycott failed to persuade others-or a sufficient number
of others-to have staying power; it failed the truth test of the marketplace.
While the "marketplace of ideas" jurisprudence speaks in terms of
truth, a contestable goal when arguing policies rather than facts, the Court has
expressly recognized that this conception of the First Amendment and the
protections it offers extend "to more than abstract discussion, unrelated to
action. The First Amendment is a charter for government, not for an institution
of learning. 'Free trade in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity to persuade
to action, not merely to describe facts."108 The boycott is precisely a means to
persuade others to action, including those being targeted and those inspired to
join. This "free trade" in persuasion is why the boycott finds a natural home
under the marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment. Where the
"truth" being tested is not of fact but of belief or opinion, the "truth" is
established by common acceptance, the de rigueurof a successful boycott and,
in fact, of every decision in a democratic society. The entire democratic system
is built upon the concept of people agreeing to live in the ways determined by a
prevailing majority, whether via their vote in an election or via their market
choice in a boycott. In addition, even when a boycott does not necessarily
achieve its ultimate end, it remains a vehicle for forcing the dissemination of an
idea. Boycotts make the perhaps otherwise latent dissent visible to a greater
number of participants in the marketplace of ideas, highlighting not only their
position but also the very existence of the debate.
Claims that boycotts fail to satisfy the values of the marketplace of
ideas because they coerce others into not speaking, thus depriving the market of
those ideas, must fail. Such claims give the boycott too much credit. Boycotts
are only one voice among many; they are a costly form of speech for the
speaker, and within the market, they can be combated with further speech.109
As the Court has often made clear, just because one voice is louder does not
mean that other voices are being silenced, and even if the danger of drowning
out arises, the way to combat it has never been to temper the louder voice."1 0 In
fact, in other contexts, the Court has held that just because a voice is being
drowned out by louder voices, the state does not have the ability to silence

108

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).

109
See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940) (holding that expression of ideas
can only be abridged when there is the "clear danger of substantive evils aris[ing] under
circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance
in the market of public opinion"); see also Declaration of Sarah E. Troupis in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at Ex. BC, Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F.
Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 2:09-CV-00058), ECF No. 19 [hereinafter Declaration of
Troupis] (illustrating further speech combating a boycott).
110
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,48-49 (1976).
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these louder voices in response. They have been explicit that "the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment."' While a successful boycott may appear to drown out another
position, the remedy is not to silence the boycott but instead for those on the
other side to endeavor to make themselves "louder."
In the case of boycotts, the marketplace element is twofold: persuasion
of others to an idea and action in the actual marketplace. Boycotts illustrate the
marketplace of ideas in the idea-forcing way discussed, but are also a classic
instantiation of this market. By tying ideas directly to market choice, boycotts
provide perhaps the best tangible example of the marketplace of ideas.
While the mingling of the market and the political via boycotts may
give some pause, there already exists a highly structured realm governed by
extensive legal doctrine where the economic and political coexist: campaign
finance. This area of the law has something to teach us about when and how the
economic and political can interact. In its most recent campaign finance case,
Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission,1 12 the Court expressly rejected
the idea that resources from the economic marketplace should not be deployed
in the political marketplace.1 13 "Political speech is indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy," 1 4 and in support of this fact, the Supreme
Court overturned Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,'15 which had
upheld restrictions on corporate election spending because corporations used
'resources amassed in the economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair
16
advantage in the political marketplace."'
Citizens United permits corporations to use their market clout in order
to influence the political process. So too should consumers--citizens-be
allowed to deploy their resources amassed in the economic market to influence
the political. As the Court has recently said, "political speech cannot be limited
based on a speaker's wealth.""' 7 This command illustrates that speech does not
lose its protected character simply because it has economic roots. Boycotts
simply operate in the opposite direction as the general concern of campaign
finance law. Just as those with great economic resources can bring them to bear
on the political sphere and not have their speech limited, so too those with
limited economic resources. Citizens United suggests all economic resources,

I

Id

130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
Id. at 904-05.
114
Id. at 904 (quoting First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
115
494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
116
Id. at 659 (quoting Fed. Election Conn'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238,
257 (1986)).
117
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905.
112
113
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not merely the expenditure of large sums of money, can be used in the political
marketplace. The boycott allows those whose main economic resource is their
participation in the market as consumers to aggregate that resource, with other
like-minded consumers, to influence the political marketplace." 8 Austin may
well have been considered the final wall holding the economic and the political
spheres separate. With its demise, it becomes all the more apparent that the
economic and political spheres are not separate in the modem American
democracy, and all other examinations of our political system bear out that they
truly are not.1' While the political boycott must sit at the core of First
Amendment protection anyway, the logic of Citizens United makes an apt
analogy quelling doubts about the protected First Amendment status of
boycotts on the grounds that they are coercive.
Political boycotts can be considered another incarnation of campaign
spending, an independent withholding rather than an independent expenditure.
Just as corporations spend, consumers must be allowed not to spend, as this is
where their market power lies. If we understand the First Amendment to protect
the right of individuals to spend in the political context,' 20 this right simply
cannot be predicated on being wealthy; its substance must be the right of all.
Just as one wealthy contributor refusing to donate or patronize could cause
different positions to be espoused, so too could many individuals refusing to
donate or patronize cause different positions to be espoused. With the current
state of First Amendment jurisprudence in the realm of campaign finance, the
actual market is expressly allowed to impact the marketplace of ideas. The
political boycott is an inversion of the usual structure: allowing those with
usually less market power-both in the actual market and that of ideas-to be
heard. While it may seem less intuitive to consider the lack of spending an
exercise of wealth in political speech, it is beyond argument that the ability to
boycott is a resource of the economic sphere, and in the case of political
118 Cf Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 414 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Citizens "are aware that however great the confidence they may justly feel in their own good
sense, their interests can be more effectually promoted by another than by themselves." (internal
quotation marks omitted)). See also David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign
Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1369, 1379 (1994) ("People give to intermediary
organizations precisely because they believe those organizations will transmit their views more
effectively.").
119 See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, Rule No. 1: Make Money by Avoiding Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 2010, at WK3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/weekinreview/
23goodman.html?_r-0 (commenting on the "revolving door that sends denizens of Capitol Hill
to highly paid jobs as lobbyists and bankers"); Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate
Campaign Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2010, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22scotus.html?pagewanted=all& moc.semityn.
www; Eric Lipton, Mike McIntire & Don Van Natta Jr., Top CorporationsAid U.S. Chamber of
available at
at Al,
2010,
Commerce Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/22/us/politics/22chamber.html?pagewanted=all.
120
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
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boycott, a resource that is being used to influence the political sphere, a
commingling of power that has been recognized and affirmed by the Court.12 1
In an additional comparison to the campaign finance debates,
boycotting takes a level of commitment and organization that is likely only to
be displayed by those intensely committed to an idea. A larger, more diffuse
group may oppose the very same idea or, more likely, have no strong feelings
about it. However, the smaller group is more likely to organize and act
collectively and is thus more likely to have an impact. The intensity of the
boycotters' views greatly impacts the success of the boycott. And it is this very
intensity that opponents of a boycott try to frame as coercion, but such varying
levels of intensity are the building blocks of representative democracy.122
Where compromise is required to accomplish anything, variant levels of
intensity allow groups to coalesce around outcomes over which they otherwise
disagree.
A successful boycott often requires those participants to pass by more
convenient and less expensive options. Consider a boycott of a particular
gasoline company: there will be points in time where the gasoline being offered
by the boycotted company is considerably cheaper than the next available
option; there will be times when a boycotter's car is nearly out of gas. An
intensely committed boycotter will be willing to pay the extra ten cents a gallon
or to risk the extra five miles. It is this level of intensity that makes a boycott
successful, above and beyond a boycott where individuals only cleave to their
commitment when it is convenient. Arguments opposing campaign finance
limits laud the use of monetary contributions in order to gauge voter intensity.
[C]ontributions allow voters-that is, contributors-to register
the intensity of their views. At the ballot box, a voter has a
difficult time showing how enthusiastically she supports a
candidate. She can vote for or against, or she can abstain. ...
By contrast, a contributor can spend her money in direct
123
proportion to the intensity of her views.
The same exact formulation can be said of the boycott: "[Boycotts]
allow voters-that is, [boycotters]-to register the intensity of their views....
By contrast, a [boycotter] can [not] spend her money in direct proportion to the
intensity of her views."1 24 The fact that a boycott privileges those positions with

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903-05 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (1990), and the wall Austin constructed between the economic and political
marketplaces).
122
Strauss, supra note 118, at 1376-77 (recognizing the power of groups with greater
intensity of viewpoint as having "an organizational advantage over larger groups whose members
have a more diffuse interest").
123
Id. at 1374.
121

124

Id
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the most intensely committed following is no reason to stifle that speech.
Numerous scholars have recognized that the small, intensely committed
persons are the more likely to have success in the political marketplace. This is
not a distinction to now be lamented; it has simply been a given in American
democracy.12 5 The boycott is yet another illustration of this common
phenomenon.
B.

Democracy and Self-Governance

Another animating theory underlying the First Amendment is that of
democratic self-government. Justice Brandeis expressed this theory most
clearly in his concurrence, joined by Justice Holmes, in Whitney v.
California,12 6 identifying speech as "essential to effective democracy., 12 7
Harkening back to the Founding, Justice Brandeis underscored the importance
of unfettered speech to self-governance.
They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread
of political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that
this should be a fundamental principle of the American

government.1 28
In American life, self-governance and democracy are the ends of any political
expression.
In the legal academy, there are two main understandings of the First
Amendment as a tool of democracy and self-governance. The first of these,
birthed by the work of Alexander Meiklejohn,12 9 views those "communicative
processes necessary to disseminate the information and ideas required for
citizens to vote in a fully informed and intelligent way"' 3 0 as within the First
Amendment's protection. Meiklejohn conceives of the First Amendment as
protecting that which citizens need to govern: protecting both the information

125

See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE

THEORY OF GROUPS
126
274 U.S. 357

(1965).
(1927), overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 394 U.S. 444

(1969).
127
Id at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
128
Id. at 375.
129

MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 25.

130

Post, supra note 26, at 2367.
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that people need in order to make informed decisions and the speech that is
necessary for people to learn how to govern.131
The political boycott fits into either one of Meiklejohn's protected
zones. Boycotts are information-forcing. They have no chance for success
unless they spread their message, so they consequently provide information
useful to democratic decision-making. Furthermore, just like a protest,
newspaper editorial, or even voting, the political boycott is by its nature a
political act, meeting Meiklejohn's second conception. It is a classic form of
political activism, requiring organization and engagement. A boycott not only
allows for further action in a democracy but it is also an action of construction
of that very democracy.
The second conception of the First Amendment as a theory of
democracy arose from a critique of Meiklejohn.13 2 This critique argues that
under his theory, all that would merit protection would be allowing the
information necessary to vote to be said once, without persuasive elements. 3 3
Clearly, that is not the speech protection afforded by the First Amendment.
Professor Robert Post has underscored the way in which the Meiklejohnian
conception of self-governance does not coincide with First Amendment
jurisprudence. Post argues for what he calls a "participatory" theory of the First
Amendment, one that "does not locate self-governance in mechanisms of
decision-making, but rather in the processes through which citizens come to
identify a government as their own."l34 Though it diverges from Meiklejohn,
the Postian theory of the First Amendment does not diverge from the practice
of the boycott.
Boycotts engage individuals and require individual, political decisionmaking, allowing people to conceive of the government as their own. Under
Post's conception of the participatory version of self-governance, the political
boycott fits squarely into the core of First Amendment protection. "According
to this theory, democracy requires that citizens experience their state as an
example of authentic self-determination." 3 5 This form of state construction
requires individual construction, which is clearly borne out in a political
boycott. The government is not a disparate entity operating separately from its
citizens, and boycotts allow just this form of individual democratic
engagement. While the Meiklejohn and Post theories of democracy focus on
differing aspects, the quality of debate and the autonomy of individual citizens,

''

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE

(1965).
Post, supra note 26, at 2367-68.
Id. at 2372.
Id. at 2367.

PEOPLE 26
'32

1
134
135

Id. at 2367-68.
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respectively,' 36 they both present self-governance-possibly a vision of the two
necessary aspects thereof-as an animating theory of the First Amendment.
The political boycott is deployed for a political reason-undertaken for
the very same reason as an electoral campaign or impact litigation. A political
boycott does not mandate any outcome; in fact, when consumers boycott to
affect decision-making, "other individuals with equally intense feelings can
respond roughly in proportion to their numbers."' A boycott from one side
does not close down debate or prevent further speech.' 3 8 For every boycott
pushing to influence social or political decisions from one side, there can easily
be one from the other. If others in the democracy disagree with the boycotters,
they can boycott in kind or expressly patronize the boycott targets, thus
frustrating the boycotters' external effectiveness. A political boycott consists of
individuals, through collective action, seeking to affect the social world around
them-the very stuff of self-governance.
C.

Self-Expression andAutonomy

The protections of the First Amendment are not created solely for the
protection of the political sphere, but to "advance 'truth, science, morality, and
arts in general."'l 3 9 Examination of the universe of First Amendment
jurisprudence further illustrates that even these ends are not the only realm of
protection.14 0 The final theory underlying the First Amendment is one of selfexpression and autonomy.141 As Justice Brennan further stressed in his dissent
in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,142 there are many spheres,

unrelated to politics or government where individual expression is paramount,
and protected by the First Amendment.143

1'

Id. at 2368.

Harper, supra note 29, at 426.
138
See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio,
394 U.S. 444 (1969)) (recognizing "[t]he preferred First Amendment remedy of 'more speech,
not enforced silence"').
139
Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967) (citation omitted).
140 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (protections for violent
video games); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (protection for depictions of
animal cruelty); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 787 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (recognizing protection for commercial speech).
141 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964, 966 (1978) ("protected conduct fosters individual self-realization and selfdetermination"); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982)
(arguing for an "individual self-realization" theory of the First Amendment); Thomas Scanlon, A
Theory ofFreedom ofExpression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972).
142
472 U.S. 749 (1985).
143 Id. at 787 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137
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[O]ur cases have never suggested that expression about
philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical
matters-to take a nonexhaustive list of labels-is not entitled
to full First Amendment protection. The breadth of this
protection evinces recognition that freedom of expression is
not only essential to check tyranny and foster self-government
but also intrinsic to individual libert and dignity and
instrumental in society's search for truth.'"
And it further is not just the high-minded realms of the liberal arts degree that
are afforded protection once one leaves the world of the political; rather the
Amendment's protection, perhaps to the chagrin of some, extends to an
individual's choice of shampoo. 14 5
Apart from any productive end a boycott achieves, it may have internal
effectiveness for those participating.14 6 A boycott can be a construction of the
self. In a boycott, individuals are making decisions about how they personally
live.147 In addition to those they hope to influence, boycotters are also making
decisions that affect their own lives and future choices. While part of the
political boycott is an aim to change the minds of others, another part is a
personal conviction of each participant that his or her money shall not be
available to be used in ways antithetical to personal convictions. There are
many places that one can patronize, so part of boycotting is the choice not to
have one's own money given to someone who may use it to support the cause
the boycott is marshaled against. While a boycott depends on collectivity for
attainment of its political ends, even in failure, it remains an expression of "a
host of voluntary decisions by free citizens."148 Boycotts require their
participants to make the decision not to patronize certain business. While in the
political boycott this action is undertaken with the goal of influencing political
and social structures or decisions, the participation itself defines each boycotter
as an individual. Boycotters are making individual decisions that say something
about who they are. Choosing never to patronize certain places can become a

Id.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It is undoubtedly
arguable that many people in the country regard the choice of shampoo as just as important as
who may be elected to local, state, or national political office.").
146
Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REv. 525, 532, 606-07 (2004) (considering
consumer choices as "moral acts that have personal significance irrespective of their instrumental
effects").
147
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 888-89 (1982) (recognizing "a host of
voluntary decisions by free citizens" as a "critical" factor to the boycott's success).
144

145

148

Id
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construction of identity for an individual. 149 The fact that the choices involved
in a boycott take place in the economic sphere does nothing to strip them of
their self-constructing features. In fact, the Court has recognized that choices
made in the economic sphere are some of the most important decisions in our
society. so
IV. BOYCOTTS AND COMPELLED DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE

The foregoing consideration of the boycott may appear backwardlooking, but the question of the political boycott is not just one of history. In an
era in which money pours into political campaigns,'' the political boycott
gives substance to the Court's findings on campaign finance, making it into a
two way street. Boycotts are again at the forefront of political debate, being
deployed in litigation in an effort to illustrate harassment.15 2 A number of
challenges to compelled disclosure regimes have surfaced in federal court in
the past several years.153 Forced by precedent to accept the state's interest in
disclosure, litigants have turned to as-applied challenges to these regimes
arguing that their particular group has been subject to such "threats,
harassment, or reprisals"'" 4 and are entitled to an exemption from disclosure
laws. In these challenges, plaintiffs point to boycotts or threats of boycotts
against supporters of the measure as evidence of such harassment. While
boycotts have the power to visit real world costs upon those targeted, the First
Amendment benefits outweigh these costs, and the utility of further speech as
the best method to combat a boycott cautions against the law responding to
boycotts in another way.
A.

Exemptions from CompelledDisclosure
In the recent decisions in Citizens United v. Federal Election

Commission and Doe v. Reed, the Court once again upheld compelled
disclosure regimes, but also reiterated the ability of groups to obtain as-applied

149
Kysar, supra note 146, at 610, 615-16; see also Harper, supra note 29, at 415 ("Individuals
frequently define themselves through the choices they exercise.").
Iso Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 763.

1'

See, e.g., TAYLOR LINCOLN, PUB. CITIZEN, OUTSIDE JoB: WINNING CANDIDATE ENJOYED

58 OF 74 PARTY-SHIFTING CONTESTS
3, 2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Outside-Job-Report(Nov.
20101103.pdf; Michael Luo & Griff Palmer, Outside Groups on the Right Flexed Muscles, N.Y.
ADVANTAGE IN UNREGULATED THIRD-PARTY SPENDING IN

TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010.

152

See supra text accompanying note 5.
1
See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010); Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F.
Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
154
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976).
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15 5 In
exemptions based on a showing of "threats, harassment, or reprisals.,
these cases, the Court found the states' interests in "transparency and
accountability"' 5 6 and "providing the electorate with information"' 5 7 sufficient
to uphold the compelled disclosure regimes under the "exacting scrutiny" test
of Buckley v. Valeo,'5 8 requiring a "'substantial relation,' between the
59
disclosure requirement and a 'sufficiently important' governmental interest."'
Despite examples where compelled speech by the government violates the First
Amendment,16 0 compelled disclosure is a well-established example of an
appropriate government function, one of both long pedigree' 6 ' and recent
confirmation.162 The boycott is not rightly considered harassment, but should
be recognized as protected First Amendment speech in its own right. Further,
the political boycott is not mere collateral fallout to be suffered in order to
enjoy the benefits of compelled disclosure. Political boycotts are valuable in
themselves and should be celebrated.
The Court has recognized a space for as-applied exemptions from
generally applicable compelled disclosure regimes. In the pre-Buckley era, the
two main cases identifying the existence of as-applied exemptions to compelled
disclosure were cases where a Southern state or municipality sought to discover
the membership of the NAACP.163 In that era, as discussed in Part II, there
were extreme risks to the black community in the South--ones that simply do
not exist for any groups in the current historical period-suggesting a careful
64
eye must be turned to current claims of threats to assess their gravity.' To

155
156

Id.
Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2819.

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (quoting Buckley,
15
424 U.S. at 66).
58
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
159
Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2818 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914).
160
See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (displaying the state motto);
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (requiring newspaper publication of
candidate reply); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (requiring
schoolchildren to salute the flag).
161 See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
162
See generally Doe, 130 S. Ct. 2811; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
163
See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
See, e.g., Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462. In the Brief for the Petitioner in this case, the
16
petitioner cites an instance of a state Senator telling people to "think white, talk white, buy and
hire white." Brief for Petitioner at 13 n.7, Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (No. 91),
1957 WL 87216 at *13. This is the only example among many that possibly comes close to a
boycott-the admonition to "buy . .. white." In fact, one of the examples proffered by the
NAACP of the continuing harassment were the raids on the Tuskegee Civic Association with the
Alabama Attorney General calling the civil rights boycott of the TCA an "illegal boycott." Id. at
17 n. 14. Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the compelled disclosure in Alabama ex rel.
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obtain an as-applied exemption, the evidence offered must show a "reasonable
probability" that the disclosure will subject the party's members or contributors
to "threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private
parties."1 6 5 In all cases of harassment analysis, it is necessary that there be more
than just a few fleeting examples, 166 rather, a "pattern of threats"l 67 must be
demonstrated. Lax requirements for the showing of "threats, harassment, or
reprisals" 6 8 would limit everyone's access to information. A weak standard
would make it far too easy for any group to generate a few examples against
themselves in order to avoid disclosure and obscure certain connections, a real
concern recognized by the Court. 169 A danger arises if courts accept an
evidentiary showing in such an as-applied challenge that only amounts to "a
handful of allegations of improper conduct ... inflated by countless incidents
in which [people] simply felt discomfort at being faced with vigorous but
constitutionally protected expressions of disagreement."i1e

Pattersonwere fraught with far more than economic reprisals. The events occurred in 1956, just
four years after the first year in the history of the United States that no black individuals were
lynched, and just barely a year after the murder of Emmitt Till. The 1959 decision came down
the same year as the lynching of Mack Charles Parker in Mississippi. See generally CHRISTOPHER
WALDREP, AFRICAN AMERICANS CONFRONT LYNCHING (2009) (discussing the history of lynching
in the United States); see also Declaration of William N. Eskridge Jr. in Support of Defendants'
Crossmotion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 6-12, Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (No.
09-CV-00058), ECF No. 264 [hereinafter Declaration of Eskridge].
165
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.
166
Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d 914, 931 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (plaintiffs'
showing of "random acts" insufficient to warrant as applied exemption).
167
168

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.

id.
169
The concern with covering up actual connections is neither speculative nor new. As the
Court recognized in McConnell, groups were hiding behind "dubious and misleading names."
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003).
170 Brief for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund., Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, at *29, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-559), 2010 WL
1256468 [hereinafter Brief for Lambda]; see also Protectmarriage.com,830 F. Supp. 2d at 932
("Finally, Plaintiffs' exemption argument appears to be premised, in large part, on the concept
that individuals should be free from even legal consequences of their speech. That is simply not
the nature of their right. Just as contributors to Proposition 8 are free to speak in favor of the
initiative, so are opponents free to express their disagreement through proper legal means.").
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GovernmentInterest in Compelled Disclosurein the Case oflnitiatives
and Referenda and the Needfor the Boycott

B.

1.

Informational Interest

While Buckley predominantly focused on candidate elections in
determining the validity of the campaign finance regime including compelled
disclosure, the informational interest recognized in Buckley, and again in
Citizens United, remains a "sufficiently important" governmental interest in the
context of issue elections. The petitioners in Doe argued that the informational
An
interest was "insufficient" as "neither compelling nor important.
informational interest, however, may in fact be more important in the case of
initiatives and referenda than in the case of candidate elections. As proponents
of the use of initiative and referenda are wont to mention, the matters tackled
through these forms of legislating are those "too important to be left to
legislatures."1 7 2 In initiatives and referenda, the people are acting not just in
government construction as when voting but as the government itself. Virtually
all of the states and the United States itself legislate publicly. In fact, on the
federal level, public legislation is constitutionally required.173 This fact
illustrates the longstanding interest in public accountability when it comes to
the passage of legislation, an interest of grave importance in a democracy.
In initiatives and referenda, individual voters serve as the legislators.
The general electorate decides which issues will be taken up-through ballot
petitions-and which laws will be enacted-through the actual ballot questions.
Arguably, initiatives and referenda are far weightier than candidate elections,
which merely stock the government for debate and compromise for legislation
at some point in the future, while ballot questions make substantive legal
changes on their face with no room for debate or compromise in the future.
With direct democracy, the whole process of governing is condensed into the
campaign cycle, so public accountability serves an even more vital role than
that considered in Buckley. This difference in structure from candidate
elections, serves to bolster, not weaken, the informational interest in the case of
both campaign finance and ballot petition disclosures.

171

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 49.

172

id.

Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2833-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The public nature of federal
lawmaking is constitutionally required. Article I, § 5, cl. 3 requires Congress to legislate in
public: 'Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of
the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be
entered on the Journal.' State constitutions enacted around the time of the founding had similar
provisions." (citations omitted)).
17'
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In addition to their role as legislators, it is also "individuals advocating
for a measure's passage or defeat"l 74 who can be considered akin to lobbyists in
this scheme. This dual role of individuals, functioning in a similar way to both
legislators and lobbyists, creates a two-fold reason for compelled disclosure in
these cases. The standard American interest in public legislating and the
accountability and transparency that come along with it remain just as
important when the people legislate as when elected representatives do. And
just as Congress has required "lobbyists to disclose who is paying for the
lobbyists services and how much,"1 75 individuals, in their role as lawmakers,
have the same interest. Everyone voting on a ballot measure has an interest in
knowing who has aimed to influence his or her vote and the votes of his or her
fellow citizen-legislators. In Citizens United, the Court analogized compelled
disclosure in campaign finance to that in lobbying.176 The "Court has upheld
registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress
has no power to ban lobbying itself," and the disclosure can "provide[] for a
modicum of information from those who for hire attempt to influence
legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose."' 7 Perhaps even
more so than in campaign finance, the necessity of lobbyist disclosure is well
recognized. 1' 8 In initiatives and referenda, donors and advocates are more akin
to lobbyists than in candidate elections, as all of the people are the legislators.
Furthermore, disclosure requirements serve a signaling function, just as
party ID does in candidate elections. 17 9 These requirements provide information
on where the support for a measure is coming from. "Much of the
contemporary research on direct democracy has concluded that campaign
spending is the best predictor of the success of ballot measures."' 80 In light of
this fact, the electorate has an interest in campaign finance disclosure so they
know what forces are aligned behind any position advocated in the fight over a
ballot initiative. This interest does not stop with large corporate donations
either. If, for example, the bulk of the financial support for an initiative came
from out of state-regardless whether this was in the form of a few large or
countless small donations-this is information of interest to voters in making

Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1208 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting
CPLC v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1106 (9th Cit. 2003)).
175
Id.
176
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010).
177
Id. (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954)).
174

171

Harriss,347 U.S. at 625.

179

See, e.g.,

CONSTITUENCY

BRUCE CAIN,

JOHN FEREJOH-N & MORRIS FIORINA, THE PERSONAL

SERVICE AND

ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE

9 (1987)

VOTE:

(commenting on the

importance of party ID in voter choice).
180
Richard Braunstein, The Impact of Campaign Finance on Ballot Issue Outcomes, in
INITIATIVE-CENTERED POLITICS: THE NEW POLITICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 77 (David McCuan &
Steve Stambough eds., 2005).
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their decisions. The district court in ProtectMarriage.comrecognized just this
interest, noting that voters would be interested in knowing whether a given
initiative "was funded by the citizens it is intended to affect or by out of state
interest groups and individuals."' 81 Additionally, such disclosure allows all
citizens to know whom to engage on issues of great importance to the
electorate, 182 thus supporting disclosure, perhaps even more strongly, in both
the case of ballot petitions and campaign finance in direct democracy. In fact,
these "disclosure requirements actually serve to facilitate discourse." 83
2.

Government Petition

At its core, the political boycott is a petition to the government for
redress of grievances,18 4 albeit a petition that counts people in a way other than
by mere signature. Professor Michael Harper has argued that the right to
petition is insufficient to protect the political boycott,' 8 as political boycotts
are often deployed in order to influence action not only with respect to the
government.' 86 This conception holds far less sway when we consider ballot
initiatives and referenda. Where the government is composed of the public, the
political boycott serves directly as a petition to "governmental action." 87
Why does a petition have any impact on the government or other
decision makers? The fact of aggregation so presented can alert its target to the
wants of a large swath of the population. Boycotts function in just this way. In
the case of initiative and referenda, it becomes ever more clear that boycotts
expressly are a petition to redress grievances. Where private individuals and not
legislators are functioning in the law-making role, there is not, at first glance, a
place to present petitions for redress. There are no constituent services aides or
offices in the state house. Instead, one of the main places this government of
private citizens lives is within the economic sphere, the area where virtually all
individuals spend the bulk of their time. Individuals spend nearly all of their
time either as consumers of some resource in the economic sphere or working
in the economic sphere in order to earn sufficient money to support their

Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1224 n.1 I (E.D. Cal. 2009).
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 49 (identifying referenda as being about "issues [that]
are too important to be left to legislatures").
183
Protectmarriage.com,599 F. Supp. 2d at 1219.
184
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909 (1982) ("[A] a peaceful march
and demonstration was protected by the rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to
petition for a redress of grievances."). The Court's decision framed the boycott as further petition
for redress of grievances, in addition to the actual physical petition-the dismissal of which
began the boycott. Id. at 914.
185
Harper, supra note 29, at 417-20.
186
Id. at 418-20; see, e.g., Cracker Barrel and Chick-Fil-A boycotts discussed supra Part II.A.
187
Harper, supra note 29, at 419.
181
182
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livelihoods. All of these activities demand constant decisions within the
economic sphere and interactions with other players therein. In the case of an
initiative or referendum, there simply is no one else for citizens to petition
besides their fellow citizens. If the courts determined that in these cases
boycotts could be counted as harassment toward the grant of an as-applied
exemption, they would wholly remove the right to petition the government for
redress of grievances whenever legislation was passed via these citizen ballot
measures. Boycotts give citizens a voice in relation to other citizens and serve
as critical tools of petition in cases of initiatives and referenda.
The results of direct democracy are far more stubborn than mere
legislative enactments. In California, for example, initiatives are "written in
stone." 8 They may only be amended or repealed via another initiative, so the
only government to which people can address themselves is to the supporters of
the initial proposition, either before-in an attempt to defeat-or after-in an
attempt to repeal or amend-its passage. Even in states where the legislature
has some power over legislation passed via initiative and referenda, the
understanding of the people as the government persists. 18 9 Notably, other states
have restrictive language limiting their legislatures' ability to either amend or
repeal initiatives, and even in states without these limitations, legislative action
on initiative-passed legislation is quite rare.190 These statutory and
constitutional limitations and the rarity of actual practice in places where the
legislature is not so limited underscore the vital importance in keeping open the
channels of petition to other members of the electorate, especially if the use of
direct democracy is to deal with issues "too important to be left to
legislatures."l91 In matters of such grave importance, it is all the more critical
that all avenues of petition are left open to the citizenry. Beyond the protection
recognized in Claiborne Hardware, it is even more important in the case of

1ss
People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 200 (Cal. 2010) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 10(c), "[t]he
Legislature may ... amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes
effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or
repeal without their approval"). Arizona also prevents legislative repeal or amendment of
initiatives. See ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, Part 1, § 1(6)(B)-(C) ("The legislature shall not have the
power to repeal an initiative measure approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon or to
repeal a referendum measure decided by a majority of the votes cast thereon. . . . The legislature
shall not have the power to amend an initiative measure approved by a majority of the votes cast
thereon, or to amend a referendum measure decided by a majority of the votes cast thereon,
unless the amending legislation furthers the purposes of such measure and at least three-fourths
of the members of each house of the legislature, by a roll call of ayes and nays, vote to amend
such measure."); see also Perry v. Brown, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, 1147 (2011).
189 PHILIP L. DuBois & FLOYD F. FEENEY, IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS:
OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 8 (1992).
190

191

Id
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 49.
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initiative and referenda that boycotts be recognized for what they truly arepetition of the government for redress of grievances, not harassment.
Michael Harper analogizes the political boycott to electoral voting. He
argues that "[b]y threatening to remove elected public officials from office,
electoral voting may 'coerce' those officials to reject political causes in which
they might believe. Yet such 'coercion' is an accepted part of governmental
decisionmaking." 92 He goes on to legitimate boycott of "businessmen who fill
important public roles of significant political influence" through the same
analogy.'9 3 While Harper's analogy is a useful starting point, it does not cover
the whole field. In the case of initiatives and referenda, every actor necessarily
fills a "role[] of significant political influence," just as every legislator and
lobbyist fill such roles. Boycotts must be recognized as legitimate in any
political deployment, not just of those "businessmen" in important roles;
increased democratization must recognize the roles played by all, not just those
with the most clout.
Elected officials listen because of the inherent risks in the decisions
they make; if elected officials disappoint large enough swaths of the electorate,
they risk losing their seats. Likewise, the boycott gives similar voice. 194 If there
is no risk for the proponents of an initiative, they have no motivation to listen to
those voicing a different opinion just as the risk of losing elections causes
elected officials to listen to their constituents. This act of petition via boycott
does not force particular action, but like any petition, it serves as an alert to the
existence of opposition and, depending on the degree of opposition, can be
influential. The petition-boycott provides information to citizen-legislators that
they may have previously lacked about the position of those most greatly
impacted or those who feel most strongly for or against a measure.
Just as different electoral factions can petition for different positions,
and thus the elected official can weigh the support of each side, those opposed
to boycotters' aims can purposefully patronize the establishment in question,
thus allowing the producer to be aware of those who support his political and
social decision-making.' 95 Likewise, if enough people patronize instead of
boycott, regardless of whether or not they are motivated by opposition to the
boycott, the position of the boycotters is drowned out by having no impact of
the producer's bottom line. Supporters of a measure, whether via donation,
petition signature, or vote, do not all possess the same level of support for the

192

Harper, supra note 29, at 425.

193

id

While Albert 0. Hirschman's concepts of voice and exit are often used in regard to a
polity, his work initially conceived of these concepts within firms. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN,
Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES To DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES
(1970). Thus, it is a natural fit to think of the boycott, a partially economic activity, in terms of
voice and exit.
195
Declaration of Troupis, supra note 109, at Ex. BC.
194
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issue, nor have they necessarily thought the issue through. Boycotters are no
different, with only the most ardent supporters sticking with a boycott at all
costs.
In a democracy, the ideal freedom is more than just the freedom to be
left alone; rather, democracy demands "'public freedom'-the ability to
participate actively in the basic societal decisions that affect one's life."1 96 This
critical form of freedom is highly important in the case of initiatives and
referenda. When acting in the vitally important role of enacting legislation,
citizens should not be insulated from interactions with each other. Decisions
should be made with interaction among the decision makers, advocates, and
ordinary citizens-groups that overlap to a greater degree in the case of
initiatives and referenda than in the case of candidate elections.
V. A RESPONSE TO ADMINISTRABILITY CONCERNS
The boycott can and does, at times, have real world consequences with
impacts felt in people's daily lives. Further, all boycotts are not created equal,
and it is important to clarify the types of boycotts thus far considered in this
Article. There are some contexts where different sets of concerns are ascendant
when dealing with the boycott, even some that may claim to have political
ends. The question of administrability is a serious one, but does not undermine
the basic argument here because political boycotts deployed by consumers do
not implicate the same concerns as boycotts and other economic action taken
by producers or others with particularized market clout.' 97 Two recognized
contexts where the calculus regarding the boycott may be different than when
consumers deploy political boycotts are economic and labor boycotts.
A.

Economic Boycotts

Boycotts of all types are sometimes framed as inherently anticompetitive;19 they put pressures on markets that are different than if the
market was left to function simply as an economic phenomenon. A boycott
without the intention of leading to political change, but with the express
intention of changing economic relationships, is a different creature than the
political boycott, and one already dealt with by federal law.199 However,

Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1068 (1980)
(quoting HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 114-15, 119-20 (1962)).
197
Harper, supra note 29, at 426-27.
198
See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (finding
boycott constituted restraint of trade).
19 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
196
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distinguishing when "anti-competitive" restraint, that is, boycotts, should be
immune from anti-trust or similar liability2 00 is not an insurmountable hurdle.
Before delving further into the question of political versus economic
restraint, I pause at the conception of defining boycotts as anti-competitive.
With the political boycott, petitioners are not engaging in anti-competitive
behavior, but rather asking the boycotted target merely to compete on a
different set of terms. There are countless producers in the marketplace-in
very few industries is there only a choice of one-and the political boycott
demands competition in other ways besides merely price or product, ways that
may be more important to certain consumers.2 0 1 In a free market, it is the
decision of each participant, including consumers, to decide the terms held
most important. Any boycott asks for sacrifice from those participating in the
boycott; so for these consumers, there is something that outweighs the cost or
conveniences of a given product when they are making their marketplace
decisions. A political boycott, among other things, shifts the terms of
competition. 202
The main distinguishing factor between an economic and a political
boycott are the ends aimed for by the boycotters. If the boycott is undertaken
because of competition between the targeted business and the boycotters or
because of any similar parochial interest, this is an economic boycott and can
be kept outside of the strong First Amendment protection recognized by the
Supreme Court for the political boycott, and so is set aside for the purposes of
this Article.203 Some may clamor against this distinction, but regardless of
one's views of such boycotts, their different jurisprudential status allows them
to be left on the outskirts of this current discussion. Nevertheless, in setting
them aside, we must consider how to distinguish between political and
economic boycotts.
Einer Elhauge makes this distinction with a focus on the financial
interests of those applying the restraint, in this case the boycott. He argues that
private motivations are an inappropriate impetus behind a restraint, while
public motivations are licit. 2 04 He would allow for public decision-making in
the launch of a boycott, but would find anti-trust liability if private decisionmaking prevailed.205 For Elhauge, "'[p]rivate decisionmaking' is thus merely a
shorthand for financially interested decisionmaking, and 'public
decisionmaking' is a shorthand for decisionmaking that is financially
200
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CALIF. L.
REV. 1177 (1992).
201
Cf Kysar, supra note 146, at 531, 584 (discussing consumers preference for certain goods
not based on price or quality of goods but upon the processes by which created).
202
Id. at 584-87.
203
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913-15 (1982).
204
Elhauge, supra note 200, at 1197.
205

Id
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disinterested and politically accountable."206 Elhauge has little interest in the
motive of the boycott-that is, whether it is deployed to achieve a political or
social end-but bases his theory solely on the financial interests of those
deploying the restraint. In this way, Elhauge may miss some boycotts that
should fall under the protection outlined in Claiborne Hardware as political
boycotts. The distinction should be based upon whether the boycott is aiming to
influence political or social change.2 07 While Elhauge's focus on identity helps
answer the question of administrability, it is not determinative of a boycott's
ends. The identity of the boycotters is a telling piece of evidence as to whether
the boycott is political or economic-the who will often answer the question of
the why-but it is not the whole ball game.208
Another conception of a political boycott is one in which "the
boycotters should be attempting to influence government action." 2 09 The
identity of the boycott target can also help illuminate whether a boycott is
political, but again, does not wholly answer the question. While recognizing the
utility of the boycott target as evidence in assessing its political versus
economic nature, allowing only boycotts directly aimed at the government to
escape antitrust liability misses a huge swath of political boycotts-misses even
those in ClaiborneHardwareitself.

A solely government-focused conception of the boycott misses the
reality that many of the most important social and political actors are not in the
government. People's lives are affected by more than merely who holds office.
Consider some of the examples discussed in Part II.A. Even in the instances
where the government was not the target, there is little ground to stand upon to
claim that these boycotts were not political. For example, the Cracker Barrel

206

Id.

Consider, for example, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Even though the private entities in
question in EasternRailroadPresidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
135-136 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965), were
motivated by economic interests, their activities were protected by the First Amendment because
they were aiming to influence the passage or enforcement of laws. While this precedent does not
apply to boycotts, these cases serve as a useful example illustrating that the economic
motivations of an actor are not always sufficient to assess the constitutional status of certain
speech.
20s But see F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). Superior
Court TrialLawyers Ass'n can be read to understand the economic motivation of boycotters to be
sufficient to answer the question of whether a boycott is economic or political. The Court may
have missed the forest for the trees in this case because the real aim of the boycott at issue was to
enhance the legal representation for indigent defendants. Clearly there were mixed motives at
issue in this boycott, but the political nature of the boycott was left wholly aside in the face of
economic benefit for the boycotters. Id. at 426-28. "In any particular case, it may be difficult to
untangle these two effects by determining whether political or economic power was brought to
bear on the government." Id. at 438 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209 Jennifer L. Dauer, Comment, Political Boycotts: Protected by the Political Action
Exemption to Antitrust Liability orIllegal PerSe?, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1273, 1301 (1995).
207

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

37

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4
568

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115

boycott dealt only with the company at hand; the boycotters were not even
trying to influence the corporation to behave in the classically political
sphere. 210 However, they were seeking an expressly political end through their
boycott-the change in a discriminatory policy mandating the firing of
employees based on sexual orientation. This was clearly not an economic goal;
at the same time, the target was clearly not the government. A focus on the
identity of the target is useful as evidence to establish the character of the
boycott, but it does not definitively answer the question as to whether a given
boycott is economic or political. The analysis must instead be aimed at the
ultimate ends of the boycotters. In an economic boycott, the ultimate end is to
impact the market position of the boycott target. And while a political boycott
very well may have the ancillary effect of altering such market position, the
ultimate end is to alter social or political reality.
B.

LaborBoycotts

The field of labor law is one occupied by an overarching federal
regulatory regime; on these grounds, this Article does not include labor
boycotts in its analysis. The labor movement serves as the historical backdrop
for many people's conceptions of boycotts and picketing, and much of this is
viewed as part of a contentious history, with boycotts in the nineteenth century
seen as wholly illegal, considering "[t]he bare assertion of such a right [as]
startlin ." 211 However, with the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in
1935,21 the federal government established a set of rules governing conflicts
between labor and management. The federal statutory framework has filled the
field of labor regulation, 2 13 leaving certain practices-for example, picketing
one's own employer 2 14 -in play, and others-the secondary boycote -out of
bounds. With this field regulated as it is, the First Amendment analysis in the
courts has been different for labor boycotts, and thus they are left aside for our
purposes.

210

See supra Part H.A.

State v. Glidden, 8 A. 890, 894 (Conn. 1887). For a more complete discussion of the labor
boycott in America, and the way in which it was seen as illegal, see MINDA, supra note 7, at 3354.
212
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006).
213
See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 427
U.S. 132, 140-48 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45
(1959).
214
29 U.S.C. § 157.
215
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B).
211
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While the argument has been made that Claiborne Hardware should
not be read as sanctioning political boycotts in general 2 16 because of the
decision of the same term, International Longshoreman's Ass'n. v. Allied
International Inc.,217 ("Allied") this point wholly misses the doctrinal
differences when operating within the highly-structured field of labor law.
Keeping in mind the different situation of labor because of the federal statutory
scheme, there rests no inconsistency between the cases. Allied itself recognized
that since a labor boycott was at issue, the case was operating within an already
existing framework reflecting "a careful balancing of interests," 1 8 and it was
not for the Court to create an exception to the carefully balanced legislation.
Analysis under the NLRA will necessarily be different than that conducted
outside of it. There is a well-recognized prohibition against secondary labor
boycotts, created by the political branches, and Allied simply recognizes this
fact. 2 19 The Court in Allied stressed that it was objectionable for a labor union
to "marshal against neutral parties the considerable powers derived by its locals
and itself under the federal labor laws."220
An examination of the motivation of the dockworkers in Allied
highlights some of the difficulty in distinguishing the political boycotts so far
discussed here from labor boycotts. This union undertook their boycott in order
"to protest the Russian invasion of Afghanistan." 2 2 1 This appears to be just the
sort of political or social end that should be at the heart of First Amendment
protection. Distinguishing these types of labor boycotts, as opposed to labor
boycotts undertaken to increase wages or gain some material benefit to the
strikers,22 2 from political boycotts is an extremely difficult task. As the Court
has been unwilling to consider the motivations of union boycotters and instead
makes the distinction based on boycotter identity in this context, in terms of
litigation, labor boycotts exist in a different space than political consumer
boycotts. This Article does not wade into the appropriate First Amendment
status for such labor boycotts, but merely recognizes the different
jurisprudential status of these boycotts and leaves them outside its analysis for
this reason.

Gordon M. Orloff, Note, The PoliticalBoycott: An UnprivilegedForm of Expression, 1983
DuKE L.J. 1076, 1090-91.
217
456 U.S. 212 (1982).
216

218 Id. at 227-28 (citing NLRB v. Retail Store Emps., 447 U.S. 607, 617 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)).
219
"The secondary boycott provisions in § 8(b)(4)(B) [of the NLRA] prohibit a union from
inducing employees to refuse to handle goods with the object of forcing any person to cease
doing business with any other person." Id at 222.
220

Id. at 225.

Id. at 214.
Such labor boycotts appear closer in kind to economic boycotts than to the political
boycotts that are at the heart of the analysis in this Article.
221

222
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Difference Between Individual Economic Retaliation and Boycotts

Another continuing concern that becomes entangled with the boycott is
that of direct, one-on-one economic retaliation. Though boycott opponents are
quick to conflate the two, listing each as examples of the same phenomenon, it
is critical to distinguish between them. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson
and in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, the parties
charged that they would be subject to economic retaliation, namely in the form
of discontinued employment.2 23 Three elements separate political boycotts from
economic retaliation. A firing based on someone's political preferences or
actions contains none of the persuasive elements of a boycott, it is merely
punitive. A boycott is dialogic, with the participants hoping to persuade the
target to political or social action. They are saying something to advocate for
their political ends. A political firing, on the other hand, contains no element of
dialogue. It has one-way impact. Furthermore, a political boycott can, and does,
come to an end, while a firing ends the relation entirely. It is possible, though
not probable, that individuals may be re-hired, but this does not change the
finality of a firing. The Cracker Barrel example discussed in Part II.A illustrates
the difference between these two phenomena. The employees were fired
because of who they were, this was not an act within the bounds of First
Amendment protection, though it was also not outside of the law because the
prevention of discrimination based on sexual orientation is still not part of the
law 2 24 and was certainly not in Tennessee in 1991. The subsequent boycott was
well within the core of the First Amendment, a political boycott aimed at
changing social decision-making.22 5 The differences inherent in the Cracker
Barrel example clearly illustrate the way boycotts differ from political firings.
In addition to the dialogic differences between boycotts and firings, the
related power structures also give rise to an extreme difference between the
two. On average, the power differentials between an employer and employee
are so great that we do not give constitutional credit to the employer's use of its
superior power position to hold political sway over the employee.2 26 In a
boycott, the one-on-one power differential is structured in the opposite way as
in economic retaliation. The individual consumer has negligible power in the
relationship with producers. This power-focused analysis does not suggest that

Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 99 (1982); NAACP v.
State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); see also Declaration of Eskridge, at
16, supra note 164.
224
See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 1397, 112th Cong. (2011); Employment
Non-Discrimination Act, S. 811, 112th Cong. (2011). Tennessee's current employment nondiscrimination statute only covers "race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or national origin,"
offering no protection based on sexual orientation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-401(a) (2012).
225
Harper, supra note 29, at 426.
226
Id. at 426-27.
223
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once a boycott has gained enough traction to make an impact it loses its
protected character. Rather, in much the same way there is no problem with the
aggregation of votes causing a change in political reality, the same is true of the
aggregation of consumer choice in a boycott. In a firing, the individual with
greater economic power is retaliating against the individual with lesser
economic power. "[O]wners of capital have specialized and very unequal
market power," and thus already have "disproportionate leverage over
important social decisions."227 This unequal power structure imbues the
employer with power over the employee, a relation that does not exist between
consumer and producer.
A third important difference between boycotts and economic retaliation
rises out of this same power structure. Firings are unilateral. One individual
makes one decision and carries it out. Boycotts are just the opposite. Operating
alone, one individual consumer boycotting has no impact. Boycotts must enlist
others, persuade others to action on the strength of the idea or the cause being
advocated. Furthermore, boycotts demand constant decisions by a large number
of people across a long period of time. In this way, boycotts demand constant
thought and reevaluation in a way that a firing simply does not. A firing
requires one decision at one point in time, while a boycott requires countless
decisions spread out over time. Because of the continuing need for a large
number of decisions in a boycott, they are also in a way incremental-the
strength and, thus, utility of a boycott can fluctuate across time. People can
initially be convinced of a boycott's goals, only to change their minds and
cease boycotting. Boycotts are also incremental because there are always
numbers, often large numbers, of people who are not convinced or simply are
not engaged so do not participate in the boycott. In this way, the producer still
has funds coming in, albeit perhaps less than before the boycott, in a way that a
fired employee does not. This incremental nature of the boycott sets it apart
from political firing where the decision is final and all encompassing. While
there may be scenarios where a boycott might operate more like mere
retaliation, acknowledging this possibility is not enough to delegitimize
boycotts generally. The differences discussed here between economic
retaliation and a boycott offer a way to address the more difficult questions of
administrability.
Half of the states, the District of Columbia, and a variety of other
jurisdictions have laws attaching civil or criminal liability 228 to economic
retaliation based upon an individual's political activities. 229 The bulk of these
enactments specifically govern the conduct of employers, thus not implicating

227

id
Eugene Volokh, Private Employees' Speech and PoliticalActivity: Statutory Protection
Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295, 297, 302 (2012).
229
Special thanks to Professor Volokh for bringing these enactments to my attention and for
his thoughts in this area.
228
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the distinction between boycotts and individual employer retaliation as
identified above. However, a handful of these laws appear on their face broad
enough to cover the activities of political boycotters. Notably, a Minnesota law
reads, "[a]n individual or association must not engage in economic reprisals or
threaten loss of employment or physical coercion against an individual or
association because of that individual's or association's political contributions
or political activity." 230 On its face "economic reprisals" could be interpreted to
cover the activity of political boycotters, especially as this enactment applies to
any "individual or association" and not just employers as do the bulk of similar
laws.231 Accepting this statute to reach the activity of political boycotters blurs
the real distinction between economic retaliation and political boycotts, as
discussed above, limiting the latter while likely enacted with the former in
mind. To survive a constitutional challenge, this Minnesota enactment, and
others like it, should be interpreted not to reach the activity of political
boycotters.232
D.

Concern Over "Less Legitimate" Boycotts

Boycotts have the ability to exact real human costs from those targeted.
A debate rages around their use, and they are deployed in litigation precisely
because boycotted business can, in fact, be deeply impacted with effects that
may ripple out to owners, employees, and even the community in which a
boycotted business resides. With these human tolls in mind, another boundary
which some may think calls for policing are bo cotts deployed because of who
someone is, rather than for a decisional goal.23 An example is admonitions to
"buy white" in the Jim Crow South.234
Recognizing these difficulties, however, does not mean condemning
the boycott. While no one would laud boycotts deployed based solely on
identity nor revel in economic suffering, the First Amendment benefits-both
in terms of allowing consumers to use their main resource in the economic

230

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1OA.36 (West 2012); see also Volokh, supra note 228, at 316.

231

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 10A.36.

The language of several statutes discussed in Volokh, supra note 228-following the same
arguments already made in this Article regarding the classification of boycotts as harassment in
compelled disclosure analysis-should simply not be interpreted to apply to boycotts and could
easily be so interpreted based on the constitutional status of the boycott and the statutory
232

interpretation canon of constitutional avoidance. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P.
FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION app. B, 29 (4th ed.

2007).
233 Harper, supra note 29, at 429-30.
234
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). In the Brief for
the Petitioner in this case, they cite an instance of a state Senator telling people to "think white,
talk white, buy and hire white." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 164, at 13 n.7.
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sphere to impact the political as well as the deep interest of the electorate in
disclosure-outweigh these concerns.
The First Amendment is a rough and tumble place. Outside of the
scope of accepted anti-discrimination laws, there is little ground to stand upon
to hold identity-based boycotts outside the law. The answer to any boycott one
finds abhorrent is to marshal support for the target or to undermine the boycott
through further speech in the marketplace. 2 3 5 There are countless examples of
groups that hold, and most often be considered, objectionable ideas or beliefs
finding protection within the First Amendment. 6 The First Amendment does
not only protect speech that most people find praise-worthy. To paraphrase the
old adage: I may disap rove of why you boycott, but I will defend to the death
your right to boycott.23
Michael Harper has attempted to draw a principled line for
distinguishing between boycotts, but his distinction may not hold up. He
charges that conceiving of the political boycott as a "right to attempt to affect
social decisionmaking readily distinguishes legitimate boycotts from those that
refuse to atronize a business because of the identity of its owners or
He argues that if someone refuses to patronize because of an
managers."
immutable characteristic of the target's identity, this should not be classified as
a political boycott because it does not have political ends, even if the boycott
cannot be classified as economic in the sense that the altered competition
economically benefits the boycotters.239 A political boycott wants to achieve
something; it is an impetus to persuade the target to action in the political or
social sphere. Boycotting based upon identity rather than activity need not be
235
See, e.g., Adelle M. Banks, Chick-fil-A to Draw Crowds and Not for Its Food, WASH.
PosT, Oct. 6, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/chick-fil-a-to-drawAdam Gabbatt, J.C.
crowds-_-and-not-for-its-food/2012/07/3 1/gJQA3omfNX_story.html;
Penney Reveals Customers' Show of Supportfor Ellen DeGeneres,THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2012,
1:13 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-news-blog/2012/feb/09/jc-penney-support-ellendegeneres, (customers voicing support for spokeswoman in response to pressure and threats of
boycott from another group over her sexual orientation).
236
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (finding a First Amendment protection
for picketers at a military funeral holding signs including "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "God
Hates Fags," and "You're Going to Hell," among others); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)
(holding a statute banning cross burning facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment);
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (finding a First Amendment protection for a
magazine describing a preacher's "first time" as "during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with
his mother in an outhouse"); Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977)
(reversing state injunction preventing Neo-Nazis from marching with swastikas through mainly
Jewish community, home to Holocaust survivors); Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735 (8th Cir.
2004) (determining a denial of highway adoption by the Ku Klux Klan was unconstitutional).
237
EVELYN BEATRICE HALL, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1906) ("1 disapprove of what you
say, but will defend to the death your right to say it.").
238 Harper, supra note 29, at 429.
239
Id. at 429-30.
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sanctioned because with identity, there is no decision-making to be targeted via
the persuasive mechanisms of the boycott.240
While initially very appealing, this argument fails to sufficiently
consider that making such a distinction is extremely difficult, if not impossible.
In fact, the distinction Harper seeks to draw between identity and action is one
already repudiated by the Court in another context. In Buckley, the Court
rejected line drawing between contributors and members. 24 ' For many, the
actions they take are intimately tied to their identities and trying to pull the two
apart is a futile effort. Attempting to pull apart identification and activity is
often a losing battle.242 Because boycotts only have their impact and exact costs
when joined by many people, the best and most effective answer to boycotts
deployed for objectionable reasons is "more speech." 2 4 3
VI. CONCLUSION

The political boycott falls within the core of First Amendment
protection as speech that "has always rested on the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values." 24 4 Despite the long and storied history
of the political boycott in the United States, there is a current trend in litigation,
where the deployment of boycotts is enumerated among the reasons why a
group should qualify for an as-applied exemption to established compelled
disclosure laws.245 While some other actions these litigants have experienced
should be considered in the harassment analysis when courts weigh the balance
between the probability of harassment and the state's interests in preventing
fraud or in providing the electorate with information, any recourse to the

240

Id.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976).
See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971,
2990 (2010) (declining "to distinguish between 'status and conduct"'); see also Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (same).
243
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 394
U.S. 444 (1969)).
244
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
245
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 981 (2010) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("opponents threatened to boycott and picket the next
festival"); Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting
Declaration of John Doe #1) ("His business has since been targeted by numerous boycotts,
several orchestrated through Facebook. At one point, someone paid for a sponsored link on
Google so that a search for John Doe #1's store resulted in a website referencing his support for
Proposition 8 and urging a boycott."); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 11 ("Boycotts were
threatened: 'We shall boycott the businesses of EVERYONE who signs your odious, bigoted
petition."' (citation omitted)).
241
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boycott to build a record of harassment is inappropriate. It should not even be
listed among the examples presented to a court. Especially in this realm where
the Court has recognized a lesser evidentiary burden,246 the listing of nonharassment actions-such as the boycott-amongst arguable examples of
harassment clouds the issue, inappropriately placing the burden on the court to
cull through the many non-examples that muddy the evidentiary showing.247
If political boycotts were to be considered harassment it would place
boycotters in an untenable situation. The state and all the members of the
electorate continue to have an abiding interest in the information presented
through the compelled disclosure regime, but the actions-actions within the
core protection of the First Amendment-of a much smaller subset of the entire
electorate would prevent the electorate's access to that information. To punish
the entire electorate and the state for the legal and constitutionally cognizable
actions of a subset thereof would stand the protections of the First Amendment
on their head. Where a political boycott is deployed, the targets would be
unable to obtain damages from those actually boycotting in deference to this
critical First Amendment right, but under the formulation that the opponents of
compelled disclosure would advocate, targets could instead deprive the entire
electorate of recognized important information.
If this Article has shown nothing else, it has established the political
boycott as a form of expression having the law's highest protection. Though
individuals may not like being boycotted, that is not a sufficiently rigorous
standard for a boycott to suddenly be transformed from "an inherent right of the
American people" 248 into harassment. The courts must not "condemn those who
have legally exercised their own constitutional rights in order to display their
dissatisfaction." 2 49 Turning the legal rights of others into harassment in the
name of the First Amendment does a great disservice to the very Amendment
those targeted by boycotts are looking to for refuge. "There are laws against
threats and intimidation; and harsh criticism, short of unlawful action, is a price
our people have traditionally been willing to pay for self-governance.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.
247
Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d 914, 932 (E.D. Cal. 2011) ("Plaintiffs'
exemption argument appears to be premised, in large part, on the concept that individuals should
be free from even legal consequences of their speech. That is simply not the nature of their right.
Just as contributors to Proposition 8 are free to speak in favor of the initiative, so are opponents
free to express their disagreement through proper legal means."); see also Brief for Lambda,
supra note 170, at 29 ("While their list contains a handful of allegations of improper conduct, it
is inflated by countless incidents in which opponents of lesbian and gay rights simply felt
discomfort at being faced with vigorous but constitutionally protected expressions of
disagreement.").
248
Protectmarriage.com,830 F. Supp. 2d at 934.
249
Protectmarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
246
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Requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic
courage, without which democracy is doomed." 25 0

250

Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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